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22 December 1962




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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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



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*Congo: [The deepening political crisis in Leopoldville makes it increasingly likely that Adoula will have to resort to force and recess parliament if he and his government are to stay in power.]

[His government's inability to work with the present parliament was highlighted again yesterday when the Chamber of Deputies voted unanimously for the release from government detention of the extreme leftist former Stanleyville leader Gizenga. There have also been continuing efforts in the Chamber to pass motions of censure against the Adoula cabinet and certain ministers.]

[Although Adoula says his government will ignore the parliament's instructions on Gizenga, Ambassador Gullion says he does not believe this.]

[Gullion yesterday expressed the belief that unless the Adoula government moves to prorogue parliament, "it will go down the drain along with Congo unification, U Thant plan, anti-Communist front and US aid committed thus far.]

[Adoula has been obviously reluctant to use force to stay in office, and has been toying instead with the idea of taking selected opposition leaders into the cabinet.]

[Congo Army chief General Mobutu and President Kasavubu have also indicated reluctance to resort to force, but both have evidenced willingness to do so if necessary to keep extremists from coming to power.]

[This latest political crisis coincides with the arrival of the US military mission to the Congo. Rumors are circulating in Leopoldville regarding the objectives of this mission, and Adoula's opponents may try to]

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organize demonstrations against it. [redacted]

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Meanwhile, with reference to the continuing Katanga problem, no progress is being made on the Belgian - Union Miniere (UMHK) payment proposal.

UMHK officials have told Foreign Minister Spaak they will not send their representatives for discussions in Leopoldville "at the present time" because of Tshombe's insistence that only his government is competent to discuss the question.

These officials also said that the US decision to send a military mission to the Congo, U Thant's call for an embargo against Katanga, and signs of anti-Belgian hostility in Katanga had completely changed the previous atmosphere of detente. [redacted]

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USSR-Cuba: Completion of the first stage of Soviet-Cuban economic negotiations for 1963 was announced in Moscow on 18 December, but there is as yet little indication of the results achieved.

A joint communiqué published on 20 December states full agreement was reached on "basic" trade issues, including the level of exchange, credits, transportation, and "other important questions."

Mikoyan, who led the Soviet side, was backed up by at least two representatives from Soviet long-range domestic planning organizations. The head of the Cuban mission, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, before his 19 December departure for home, expressed satisfaction with the preliminary talks, citing in particular the "understanding" shown by the USSR toward questions of credits and deliveries of "most important commodities."

Detailed negotiations for a 1963 trade pact are being continued by delegations headed by the Cuban and Soviet foreign trade ministers.

The communiqué stipulates a "broadening" rather than an increase of trade next year. The trade level originally was scheduled to reach some \$750 million in 1962, but, because of deficiencies in Cuban exports, the total for the year probably fell short of this goal by \$75 million to \$100 million. In view of the bleak outlook for Cuban exports, additional Soviet aid almost certainly will be required if even the 1962 volume of Cuban imports is to be maintained next year. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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CEMA Meeting: The party first secretaries of CEMA countries may meet soon to decide on the question of pooling the national economies of member states, according to a Yugoslav correspondent in Bucharest. The subject has been discussed at the just-concluded session in Bucharest of the CEMA Council, and probably will be considered also at a meeting of the CEMA Executive Committee.

It seems likely that the party secretaries will reach agreement on some type of observer status for Yugoslavia. No representatives or observers from Albania, Communist China, or North Korea have been in Bucharest; there was an observer from North Vietnam.

In his speech on 19 November to the CPSU central committee plenum, Khrushchev said that "in all probability, in the near future, representatives of CEMA member countries will have to meet again at the highest level..."

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


Afghanistan: Prime Minister Daud has again emphasized that Afghanistan is prepared to risk the loss of US economic assistance rather than re-open its border to US aid shipments through Pakistan. He is trying to persuade the US to make greater use of Iran as a transit route. Daud has told Ambassador Steeves that he recognizes that Afghan neutrality may be at stake but that nevertheless his government would not make any additional concessions to Pakistan on the Pushtoonistan dispute or on the border closure.

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The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

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